Monday, September 12, 2011
Miguel De Beistegui on the interconnectedness space and time, space-time, and Ereignis.
The unity, or intimacy (Einigkeit, Innigkeit) of time and space lies in this counter-turning, in the becoming other of each: "This counter-turning is indeed what is essential and indicates the originary referral of both to each other, on the basis of separatedness [Geschiednis]."[P. 269] And so, it is on the basis of their being two counter-tendencies, one oriented toward dispersal, the other one towards estrangement, that each one comes into its own. It is in their very separateness, their very counter-orientation, that each is brought into its own essence and proper unfolding. But at no stage is this opposition dialectical, for both unfold, as counter-tendencies, from the structure of Ereignis itself, torn between--and this being-torn-apart, this quartering is not the result of some indecision, some temporary state of hesitation, but designates Ereignis in its essence--belongingness and call. This primal and irreducible 'event' is the forever-renewed origin of time-space, the very source of the spatializing and the temporalizing that is world configuring.

But in the end, what matters most is that this temporalizing and this spacing be that of Ereignis, understood as the unity of belongingness and call, as this singular and unique event on which fate of the human hinges. Ereignis, as the event of time-space, is thus the unity and co-originarity of this movement of ecstasy and captivation, dissemination and alienation, in and through which time is from the start brought back into the hold of space, and space itself from the start carried away in the breaking out of time.History is nothing other than the state of equilibrium reached at any given time by this spatio-temporal economy. History is of time-space. It is the mark or the inscription of a particular configuration of the tension opposing time and space.

P. 93
"... at no stage is this opposition dialectical."

While I have not read anyone who can handle the time-space description better (this side of poetry, anyhow) denial of dialectics does not cure what sure looks like dialectics to me.

But being limited only to denial sure seems impoverished to me.
Rereading Time and Being I realized that when I first read it many years ago, I simply did not understand it. So looking at it again shows I have learned a little something in the meantime.

I see now why some commenters accuse MH of resorting to mysticism and why others allege apophasis as MH's later style.

I doubt either of those pigeonholes is accurate. Until we find a new vocabulary, which we may not understand at the time, asserting something about time-space is denied us.
It took me years to make sense of B&T, and while I can't claim to have all the existentiells at my fingerprints, nowadays when I dip in it all seems so self-evident...Mysticism, apophasis, jargon, nattering negativistic nihilism, where?
One thing about SZ that I find irksome is MH's refusal to specifically engage the philosophical debate--like, say dialectic: e.g. Kant's 3rd Antinomy, and its relation to Hegel's system (itself rather perplexing). Is he ..orthe commenter saying (I don't have the section here) the 3rd Ant. has been resolved, never was a real problem, a philosophical mistake..etc. I don't always agree with Kant's solutions to philo.chestnuts (or even his..setups) but..the 3rd Antinomy is ...shall we say weightier then many philo-types including PoMos think (really, freedom and determinism itself--or so-called freedom to some--a dissertation in itself, and not without scientific/psychological import). MH may have addressed in detail somewhat (Kantbuch?) but I don't recall it in SZ.
Blattner, in his book on B&T, says that MH's distinction between factuality and facticity is similar to Kant's distinction between judging a person morally or psychologically/deterministically.

In GA 31 (The Essence of Human Freedom) MH discusses Kant's third antinomy.

I'll try to put some posts together later this week. Tonight's curriculum night at the junior high and tomorrow's my neighborhood's annual meeting.
The references in the later MH I have seen to dialectic, Kant, and Hegel regrets them all as dependent on metaphysics. In Time and Being MH credits Hegel as the most "powerful" philosoper of the modern epoch, but that is the epoch to be 'aufgehoben-ed' (my interpretation, maybe not MH's).
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