[Let's consider] why Heidegger calls his topic Ereignis and specifically, whence he derives that word. For now we may retain this much: (1) that the topic seems to be the emergent topos which possibilizes all modes of beingness; (2) that the topos happens only in and "as" essential, proper human existence, whether seen in terms of resolve’s self-appropriation of what one properly is or as being appropriated and employed for the emergence of sense-as-such; and (3) that somehow the topos has a bi-dimensionality of presence and absence whereby both these moments must be given, although in different ways, insofar as both constitute the topos which itself is sense.

Having shown what Heidegger’s topic is not and provisionally what it is, we may now ask why it is called Ereignis. In order to show the Aristotelian "basis" of the term I shall draw upon the 1939 text "Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις. Aristoteles Physik B, 1" and the unpublished 1928 seminar "Phänomenologische Übungen Interpretation von Aristoteles, Physik II." I will show briefly (1) the phenomenological implications of understanding kinesis as energeia ateles;(2) that in formal terms the pattern operative in kinesis is that of retrieve; and (3) that the pattern of the movement of retrieve is the pattern which finds expression in the word Ereignis.

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¶ 5:40 AM