Friday, February 24, 2012

The Third Place reads David Cerbone's "Heidegger and Dasein’s 'Bodily Nature'", on why embodiment cannot be a part of Dasein's essence.
Another line of argument is that Dasein cannot be reduced to something present-at-hand, and so embodiment cannot be part of the analytic. Again, he assumes that the body is nothing more than a present-at-hand thing which Dasein occupies. Working on these assumptions it is no wonder that he worries about dualism sneaking in. Similarly, organs (and thus the body) are defined in the way that they differ from equipment, as he once again assumes that the body is a mere physical object. If the body were part of the existential analytic it would surely not need to be carefully distinguished from equipment, which is of a different kind.
I consider the body to be part of Dasein, otherwise Dasein wouldn't be finite.
Thank you for drawing this paper to our attention. As MH worked the concepts of world and Dasein over a period of time, the comments here seem to me to be accurate. (And lots of folks who have never gotten to the 'later' MH offer premature comments these days. Glad to see so much interest but some of it is stubbed.)

Certainly, the body is finite. Yet sometimes MH's use of 'essence' does seem to suggest a dimension beyond our customary contrast of finite/infinite. I recently quoted elsewhere Stambaugh's: "Heidegger can say that if being is thought as in-finite, it must be thought as a definite infinity. If it is thought as finite, its abysmal character is brought out."
Thanks for taking the time to read the post :) I agree completely with your comment, Dasein must surely be embodied, and more than that its embodiment should be part of the existential analytic.
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