To the extent that the mutability of being is not—-not, that is, a being-—its reality is necessarily imaginary, if by imaginary we understand, as Heidegger invites us to, a nonobjective modality of presence free of every reference and referent. Such a reality, visibility, and phenomenality form and determine in the same move a philosophical inquiry aimed at these. Seeing the change of being—-being as (ex)change [change]—-seeing that which changes, seeing the incision of the other in man, God, and thinking is only possible for the philosopher if she invents a manner of ensconcing herself in this hole or cavity in thought that always refuses itself to concepts and that the triad, through the very emptiness of its name—-W, W, & V-—constantly invites investing as merits it: otherwise. Otherwise than conceptually, that is, which means two things: otherwise than through recourse to traditional philosophical techniques, and otherwise than through the Heideggerian philosophemes that are nonetheless immediately available for expressing change in the full day of the text—-time, historicality, Ereignis, and all the figures of the turning or leap.

Constructing the Heidegger change therefore demands that we both locate and create the level of intelligibility specific to the change required by the structure of Heidegger’s thinking itself inasmuch as it opens in itself this distance or gap between the manifest character of its aims (the overcoming of metaphysics, time, history, Ereignis) and the scarcely nameable—-W, W, & V—-background movement that is their obscure support and indispensable accomplice. What matters is that we experience and test the metabolic potential of this thought, the sole one to have only ever spoken to us, from the forgetting of being to the coming of the other thinking, of what is never seen.

Pp. 11-2

¶ 4:42 AM