Parvis Emad on closing off to the openness.
But for projecting-open, for the "leap" to be enacted, two things must be open to each other: projecting-open must be open to the swaying of be-ing, the so-called enowning, and be-ing’s swaying, that is, enowning must be open to this projecting. To understand precisely what Heidegger means with shifting into the open, we must bear in mind this mutual openness. And this excludes the possibility of conceiving this shift into the open—this projecting which is an acting (Handeln)—as initially closed off to the openness of the domain of the swaying of be-ing, namely, enowning, and trapped in a closure. What is phenomenologically observable is that this projecting shifts into the openness of be-ing’s swaying (into enowning) because this projecting-open itself is open and receptive to this openness. In other words, projecting-open is an acting that from the ground up is open to receiving and disclosing the swaying of be-ing, that is, enowning. By receiving and opening this swaying, projecting-open opens the swaying of be-ing and keeps it open. If projecting-open were not fundamentally open to be-ing’s swaying, it would amount to the intrusion of a closure into the domain of openness, that is, into the swaying of be-ing, or enowning. If this were the case, projecting-open would designate a juncture where closure to the swaying of be-ing and openness of this swaying would collide. Collision between closure and openness, however, is bereft of phenomenological relevance—it is sheer speculation. If this is the case, then we must reject as irrelevant and misleading the deconstructionist view that there is a closure in Heidegger’s thought.