Heidegger further pushes the notion of Time as a ‘how’ when he asks about the knowability of Da-Sein; how is that something can be known ‘in its be-ing before it has come to an end’? Heidegger makes a major move in his dual analysis of time and Da-Sein when he states that, insofar as death is Da-sein’s most extreme possibility and it is characterized by its ‘certainty’ and ‘utter indeterminacy’, any attempt to know death will be a ‘forerunning to its being gone’; a motion that aims towards death as the most extreme possibility of Da-Sein. This ‘being gone’ is not a ‘what’ for Heidegger, but instead a ‘how’; it is established as ‘my being gone’ and is what Heidegger calls ‘the proper ‘how’ of my Da-Sein’.

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