Derrida thinks that he has gone further than Heidegger, when he underlines that “différance is not a process of propriation in any kind of sense” (Marges, 27, n. 1). Heidegger does not think the unfolding of the ontological difference as a mere process of propriation because, not only is the advent of being an interplay of presence and absence and not the realm of pure presence, but there is also no propriation without depropriation, insofar as depropriation (Enteignis) belongs to the advent of propriation (Ereignis) as such (ZSD 23/TB 22 f.). The most original phenomenon is not for Heidegger the co-propriation of man and Being, the correlative Erschlossenheit of Dasein and Sein, which he will later call Ereignis, but the depropriation of both, die Enteignis, which is nothing other than the abyssal depth of the lèthè from which comes everything that is (present) (ZSD 44/TB 41). Because Heidegger is the thinker of lèthè, he is, perhaps more than Nietzsche, the thinker of the active oblivion of the metaphysical side of being, by which it appears as a pure and constant presence, unspoiled by death and time, on behalf of the custody of the other side of being by which it acknowledges itself as the “gift” of death, night, and oblivion.

Pp. 287

¶ 2:16 AM