Hints about Ereignis
from the Le Thor seminar in 1969.
It is then asked: what relation does enowning have to ontological difference? How is enowning to be said? How does it fit into the history of being? Is it supposed to be the countenance of enowning for the Greeks? Finally is it possible to say: "Being is enowned through enowning"? Answer: yes.
In order to take a few small steps into these difficult questions (which remain all too difficult as long as their understanding is not sufficiently prepared), let us first consider a few indications that could help us discern various and yet convergent paths of access to the question of enowning?
--The most appropriate text for a clarification of this question is the lecture "The Principle of Identity," which is even better heard than read.
--An excellent way of approaching enowning would be to look into the essence of enframing [Ge-Stell], insofar as it is a passage from metaphysics to another thinking ("a Janus head" it is called in On Time and Being), for enframing is essentially ambiguous. "The Principle of Identity" already says: enframing (the gathering unity of all ways of positing [Weisen des stellens]) is the completion and consummation of metaphysics and at the same time the disclosive preparation of enowning. This is why it is by no means a question of viewing the advent of technology as negative occurrence (but just as little a positive occurrence in the sense oof a paradise on Earth).
--Enframing is, as it were, the photographic negative of enowning.
--Thinking enowning with the concepts of being and the history of being will not be successful; nor will it be with the assistance of the Greek (which is precisely something "to go beyond"). With being, the ontological difference also vanishes. Looking ahead, one would likewise have to view the continual references to the ontological difference from 1927 to 1936 as a necessary impasse [Holzwege].