In NDPR, Dermot Moran reviews Steven Crowell's Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger.
For Crowell, Heidegger is interested in clarifying what is means to be a genuine agent. Dasein is care (Sorge) and primarily is concerned about his or her own existence; rationality is secondary. Crowell contrasts Kant and Heidegger in terms of responding to a call. For Heidegger, one does not respond because of recognition of the intrinsic rationality of the call. Authenticity, on Crowell's interpretation of Heidegger, means recognition that I am responsible for the normative force the norms have on me. Heidegger is interested in Aristotle's phronesis, as Gadamer and others have pointed out, but Crowell makes clear that Heidegger departs from Aristotle in his account of the place of practical wisdom in human action. Phronesis is not fundamental for Heidegger -- conscience is. Indeed, the section on Heidegger's understanding of conscience is one of the deepest and most original aspects of this book. Action according to Heidegger is essentially "conscience-less" until it is taken over by conscience. Crowell clarifies that this accordance to norms does not necessarily involve deliberation and can be an immediate response to a situation. Heidegger does not say much about deliberation. Deliberation is for him embedded in specific practices. Deliberation is the thinking part of one's embeddedness in a situation.