I heard Rockmore's talk this morning and I didn't get his ultimate point. Is it that historians are the arbiters of what can be studied? That once a historian demonstrates that someone was an anti-Semite, their works should be avoided? I don't know why philosophers should bother with such criticisms any more than logicians, physicists or rocket scientists.
I've liked Gessmann's talk the most so far. His outline of the evolution of Heidegger's ideas in the 1930's is a good beginning. I'll need to listen to it again more carefully, when I'm not raking leaves from the Weg.
The question I'm most curious about in the early thirties is: MH engaged with Hegel, histor* and political philosophy. Those lectures and seminars have now been published (I received the translation of GA 86 last week), and I can't see what H got out of that engagement with Hegel.
By 1935 MH abandoned Hegel, and turned to art, poetry and Nietzsche. In WS 1937-38 (GA 45), he laid out his understanding of the history of being, which is a foundation for his later work, and I don't see what that history of being kept from his earlier engagement with Hegel.
Now that the material is available, I'm waiting for an interpretation of MH's early 30s work on Hegel, which explains how it fits in with MH work as a whole, or doesn't. Is it necessary, to get to the later Heidegger, or was it a dead-end?
Agreed about Gessmann, best of those i've listened to so far. Though by temperament i actually prefer the later Heidegger, Gessmann makes an interesting argument for the earlier work as you've noted in your comment.
I don't think Rockmore even read any of the Notebooks.
I didn't make it through Gilman, but wasn't under the impression i was going to miss anything after listening to the first few minutes.