Wednesday, October 08, 2014
In NDPR, Stefan Kristensen reviews Frank Chouraqui's Ambiguity and the Absolute: Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty on the Question of Truth.
The Deleuzian objection has to do with the conception of Being as fullness or as identical with becoming; Deleuze criticizes phenomenology for operating with a concept of intentionality directed towards things, which then, in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, would concern Being as such. In form of a question, this objection would be: Is there any way to conceive of Being as full, as completely possessed by intentionality, i.e., is there any way to establish a truth concerning Being as such? The Heideggerian objection is that Nietzsche never actually overcomes the idea that Being is the whole of all beings, that is, he didn't formulate the "question of Being" as such. In other words, Nietzsche's position according to Heidegger remains metaphysical (interrogating what things are and finding that they are characterized by the will to power), and doesn't reach ontology (interrogating what it means for the things to be).
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