Stephen Mulhall on the authenticity of replicants.
Deckard’s response to death is inauthentic because it transforms
his own death from an (omnipresent) possibility into an actuality:
it extinguishes his humanity. So Roy teaches him the difference
between possibility and actuality; he allows Deckard (and
us) to spend long minutes on the edge of his existence, pushes
him to the edge of a real abyss, making death seem unavoidable –
and then he rescues him. And he underlines the point of that
lesson by making manifest, at the moment of his own death, that
he has revelled in his time:
I’ve seen things you people wouldn’t believe: attack-ships
on fire off the shoulder of Orion; I watched c-beams glitter
in the dark near the Tannhauser Gate. All those moments
will be lost in time, like tears in rain. Time to die.
He has lived each moment of his life to the full without denying
its transitory place in the ineluctable stream of time; and any such
denial would amount to denying the essential structure of human
experience as such. It would, moreover, count as a further and
more profound failure of acknowledgement to wish to bequeath
one’s experiences and memories to others – as if one could outlive
oneself, as if one’s moments of consciousness were alienable,
as if one’s mortality could be sloughed off. Heidegger understands
our relation to our own death as the clearest expression of
this truth. He describes it as our ownmost, nonrelational possibility:
no one can die another’s death for him, just as no one can
die our death for us, and that is precisely what makes our death,
when it comes, our ownmost possibility. Roy’s calm and moving
last words manifest just this authentic understanding, and they
cry out for acknowledgement as such.
P. 38