Wednesday, November 12, 2014
Stuart Elden on the measure of all things.
Rather than the Cartesian division of subject and object, the division of human from the world, grounded on the cogito and the split between res cogitans and res extensa, we have a way of understanding that looks at the way we comport ourselves always already within a world [Welt]. Heidegger’s hyphenated term being-in-the-world, used in Being and Time, shows that what we call ‘being’ is indivisible from the world or environment [Umwelt]. ‘The world that is closest to us is one of practical concern. The environing world [Umwelt], and its objects are in space, but the space of this world is not the space of geometry’.119 As he puts it in the Kriegsnotsemester, ‘es weltet’, ‘it worlds’. This use of the impersonal ‘it’ is related to Heidegger’s interest in the term es gibt, which literally means ‘it gives’, and has the sense of ‘there is’, in the impersonal sense of the French il y a. For Heidegger, both in this early lecture course and the Beiträge, it is Ereignis that gives being, time, space. In opposition to the worldview, to the view the human has of the world, the grid they use to comprehend, order and exploit the world, the world rather gives to us the view, the comportment (GA2, 211). It is this sense of experience, as a propriation, an Ereignis, that can be used to refute Descartes, rather than the ‘lived-experience’ that too stems from Descartes. In a sense, this is a reversal of the reversal of Protagoras: rather than the human being the measure of all things, the measure of all things is the human.
P. 152
Also, Stuart Elden in conversation with Babette Babich video.
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