Derrida on Anaximander's Spruch.

And yet, declaring this "without equivocation, the Spruch also says something else—or it only says this on condition. It would name the disjointure (άδικία) or the "injustice" of the present only in order to say that it is necessary διδόναι δίκην. (The duty or the debt of the "it is necessary" is perhaps excessive, even if Nietzsche translates: Sie müssen Busze zahlen, they must pay penalty.) In any case, it is clearly a matter of giving, of giving Δίκη. Not of rendering justice, to render it in return by means of punishment, payment, or expiation, as one most often translates (Nietzsche and Diels). There is first of all a gift without restitution, without calculation, without accountability. Heidegger thus removes such a gift from any horizon of culpability, of debt, of right, and even, perhaps, of duty.

P. 25

At first, "removes such a gift from ... debt" seems wrong. If Anaximander's fragment is understood physically — that Anaximander's is on about calculating the balance between things' water/air/earth/fire — then justice/debt would be the wrong translation of δίκη. If Anaximander's on about the way phenomena appear to dasein, then debt's involved because debt has always been a part of every historical understanding of being. Dasein's always been paying her debts, to society, to God for creating the universe, or forgiving our debts. So the gift, then, is that the clearing/open/beyng makes things possible, debt-free, before any dasein's understanding of being mediates her relationship with things. Simply put, ἀλήθεια-1 precedes ἀλήθεια-2.

  ¶ 2:33 AM