Jacques Taminiaux on
fitting Greek philosophy to fundamental ontology.
[Heidegger's] own distinction between the everyday preoccupation of the "they"
(das Man) and the authentic sight of the self owes much to Plato's
distinction between the opinion of the πολλοί and the clear sight of the
philosopher. Likewise for his own concept of the disclosing function of
discourse which owes much to Aristotle's λόγος ἀποφαντιχός. Likewise
even for his concept of resoluteness which was, to some extent,
inspired by the Aristotelian φρόνησις. For all these reasons, Heidegger
never says that Greek ontology was merely trapped within the inauthenticity
of everyday preoccupation. He merely says that Greek ontology
was naïve.[P. 110]
Naïveté combines freshness, genuineness, but also some
sort of lack of awareness. Thanks to the freshness of their naïveté, the
Greeks revealed many essential features of everydayness. Thanks to the
same freshness they understood that the struggle over being leads back to
the being that we are. In both cases they provide a model of fundamental
ontology. But because of the lack of awareness implied in their naïveté,
they were unable to discover that existence, our existence, taken in its
ground, is the only genuine horizon for a unified understanding of all the
meanings of being. This is why Heidegger concludes his remarks about
the Greeks as follows: "We not only wish but must understand the
Greeks better than they understood themselves. Only thus shall we
actually be in possession of our heritage."[P. 111]