Since the mood of anxiety is an experience of a disruption of the character of average everyday dealing with entities, it is a modification of falling, which in turn is grounded upon an originary and ontological angst from which we fall. The reason this ground of falling is a form of angst is that there is something inherently opaque in it since the "whence" of Dasein's thrownness is obscure and can never be completely grasped. From this interpretation, Withy deduces several important conclusions regarding the finitude at the ground of what it means to be a human being, arguing that it "in fact coincides with Dasein's being" and that "Being-in-the-world is angst". Through this important notion of originary angst, Withy shows how an ontological form of uncanniness lies in Dasein's finitude: the whence of its thrownness withdraws from it, is fundamentally opaque, and therefore Dasein cannot get a full hold of its own ground. There is uncanniness at Dasein's ground, and falling is a falling from this uncanniness.

¶ 9:21 PM