Katherine Withy on ontological pluralism.
In grasping the entity in terms of a certain sort of possibility, I am making
it meaningful as a certain sort of what (essentia). A particular kind of
that (existentia) will correspond to this. In other words: for different kinds
of entities there are different kinds of standards for counting as that and
what they are. What the teacup is is what it is for (in order to), since tools
are meaningful in terms of what they are correctly used for. The fact that
the teacup is consists in its being available for use: it is the case that there
is a teacup when there is an entity that it is possible to use in the way that
teacups are used. A piece of quartz, by contrast, will have its that-being in
manifesting a certain chemical composition. Its being what it is consists in
that chemical composition falling within a range of possible patterns of
oxygen, silicon, and other atoms. These examples show that there is a variety
of kinds of that- and what-beings—what we might call different “ways”
or “ modes ” of being. There is thus a variety of ways in which entities can
make sense, and correspondingly different “categories of intelligibility.”
Since not everything is meaningful in the same way, we (like Aristotle) must
conclude that being is said in many ways. Heidegger is thus an ontological
pluralist.
P. 314