Andrew J. Mitchell on truth as the clearing vs. ἀλήθεια.

The Contributions also make clear that the “truth” of beyng is to be understood in terms of the Greek ἀλήθεια, Unverborgenheit, unconcealment, but the quality of this unconcealment is thought now in a remarkable way. Rather than the disrobing of something previously hidden, what unconcealment brings to light is concealment itself. That is to say, unconcealment is not simply a matter of revealing something otherwise concealed, it is no longer thought in such rough and ready oppositions. Unconcealment is now capable of letting appear the concealment that is essential to all revelation. The height of unconcealment is this ability to reveal without thereby stripping things of the concealment proper to them. Heidegger’s conception of truth brings concealment and unconcealment together and this distinguishes it from Greek ἀλήθεια, which, we might suppose, still operated upon a concealment/unconcealment opposition: “Truth as the clearing for concealing is therefore an essentially different project from that of ἀλήθεια, although it belongs directly to the memory [Erinnerung] of ἀλήθεια and ἀλήθεια to it” (GA 65: 350/277, tm). When things appear in truth they are attended by a peculiar concealment.

P. 16

A few sentences earlier he says that with ἀλήθεια, as unconcealment, that concealment itself is experienced -- i.e., ἀλήθεια-2 (significance).   ¶ 1:57 PM