Andrew J. Mitchell on truth as the clearing vs. ἀλήθεια.
The Contributions also make clear that the “truth” of beyng is to be understood
in terms of the Greek ἀλήθεια, Unverborgenheit, unconcealment, but
the quality of this unconcealment is thought now in a remarkable way.
Rather than the disrobing of something previously hidden, what unconcealment
brings to light is concealment itself. That is to say, unconcealment
is not simply a matter of revealing something otherwise concealed,
it is no longer thought in such rough and ready oppositions. Unconcealment
is now capable of letting appear the concealment that is essential
to all revelation. The height of unconcealment is this ability to reveal
without thereby stripping things of the concealment proper to them.
Heidegger’s conception of truth brings concealment and unconcealment
together and this distinguishes it from Greek ἀλήθεια, which, we might
suppose, still operated upon a concealment/unconcealment opposition:
“Truth as the clearing for concealing is therefore an essentially different
project from that of ἀλήθεια, although it belongs directly to the memory
[Erinnerung] of ἀλήθεια and ἀλήθεια to it” (GA 65: 350/277, tm). When
things appear in truth they are attended by a peculiar concealment.
A few sentences earlier he says that with ἀλήθεια, as unconcealment, that concealment itself is experienced -- i.e., ἀλήθεια-2 (significance).