On meanings of time.
[T]here is one place in Being and Time where Heidegger almost allows an
ontic event to affect ontology, to effect an ontological change. It comes in the final
chapter of the book as we have it, 2.VI, which discusses different forms of time. He
starts with how we “reckon” pre-ontologically with what he calls “world-time” in our
average everyday ways of going about our business. World-time possesses versions of
worldly characteristics—datability, span, publicness, and
significance—all of which are at bottom consequences of something like a
temporal intentionality: time is always the time of or for something in that every time is
bound up with what takes place at that time. Heidegger contrasts this lived-time with the
abstract theoretical conception he calls the “ordinary understanding of time.” This
conception impoverishes world-time’s rich relations, leaving a “now-time” that is merely
a sequence of hermetically sealed nows like so many Cartesian substances set side-byside
in a row. “World-time thus gets levelled off and covered up by the way time is
ordinarily understood.” Now-time is basically Newtonian time—an infinite, perfectly
constant flow of identical moments wholly detached from and unaffected by their
If this contrast between these kinds of time looks familiar, that’s because it is; it’s
an echo of the contrast between ready-to-hand equipment and present-at-hand objects that
guides Chapters II and III of Division 1.
Lee Braver, "Heidegger, Foucault, and Clocks: An Impure Genealogy of Time".