On meanings of time.

[T]here is one place in Being and Time where Heidegger almost allows an ontic event to affect ontology, to effect an ontological change. It comes in the final chapter of the book as we have it, 2.VI, which discusses different forms of time. He starts with how we “reckon” pre-ontologically with what he calls “world-time” in our average everyday ways of going about our business. World-time possesses versions of worldly characteristics—datability, span, publicness, and significance—all of which are at bottom consequences of something like a temporal intentionality: time is always the time of or for something in that every time is bound up with what takes place at that time. Heidegger contrasts this lived-time with the abstract theoretical conception he calls the “ordinary understanding of time.” This conception impoverishes world-time’s rich relations, leaving a “now-time” that is merely a sequence of hermetically sealed nows like so many Cartesian substances set side-byside in a row. “World-time thus gets levelled off and covered up by the way time is ordinarily understood.” Now-time is basically Newtonian time—an infinite, perfectly constant flow of identical moments wholly detached from and unaffected by their contents. If this contrast between these kinds of time looks familiar, that’s because it is; it’s an echo of the contrast between ready-to-hand equipment and present-at-hand objects that guides Chapters II and III of Division 1.

Lee Braver, "Heidegger, Foucault, and Clocks: An Impure Genealogy of Time".  ¶ 1:38 PM