To be sure, one must also add that in taking up again the Aristotelian determinations of πρᾶξις, Heidegger 'ontologizes' them and that this ontologization is the equivalent for him of a radicalization. For it permits him to grasp the fundamental unitary connection which upholds these determinations and which is, notoriously, temporality conceived in an originary way (Zeitlichkeit). At the end of all this, and once he has carried through his 'ontologization', Heidegger takes up a distance with regard to Aristotle. Aristotle was not able to see originary temporality as the unitary ontological foundation of the determinations of human life which, nevertheless, he grasped and described, because he remains within the horizon of a naturalistic, chronological and non-chairological understanding of time. Even the celebrated aporie of the relation between the ψῡχή and χρόνος explicitly raised by Aristotle (Physik IV, 14, 223 to 21, 29) which is handled in a magisterial manner by Heidegger in his commentary on the Aristotelian treatment of time, seems to be insufficient, in Heidegger's eyes, to extract Aristotle from the horizon of the naturalistic understanding of time.
And yet: Aristotle does anticipate correctly, even if only at the ontic level, the intuition which Heidegger raises to the ontological power with the equation of Dasein and Zeitlichkeit. This is a conjecture which can be based upon a passage from De anima III, 10, where it seems as though Aristotle attributes to man, as a specific characteristic distinguishing him from animals, the perception of time (χρόνου αἲσθησις). The attribution is, to tell the truth, controversial; but the fact that Heidegger, who shows that he knows the passage very well, nevertheless interprets it without hesitation in this sense, and the fact that, in addition, he links the perception of time with the capacity for action in order to define the specific character of human life, lends unquestionable credence to this conjecture.
