Using Heidegger's critique of the instrumental/anthropological understanding of technology, Coeckelbergh mentions Heidegger's notion of the "essence" of technology, only to set it aside. However, Heidegger's "essence" (Wesen) refers not to the idea or concept, and certainly not to the uses, of technology but to the "modern" manner of the unfolding of being, which makes technology in its modern senses and uses possible in the first place. As such, this Wesen, as Heidegger underscores, is nothing technological, that is, it is not a technological product, process of production, or knowledge. Rather, it is a way of "revealing" into a technological enframing of being (of experience, things, words, etc.). That is why technological objects, knowledge, or processes do not themselves "reveal" in this sense, but, on the contrary, can in fact conceal the force with which the "essence" of technology reveals/unfolds the world today.

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