Jason W. Alvis on Heidegger's phenomenology of the inconspicuous.
Whatever is inconspicuous has a distinctive unique "ability" (barkeit)
and understood in its "paradoxical" (as "contrary to appearances") provenance,
seeks to go beyond dichotomies that often hinder phenomenological thinking.
It refers to what is integrated within, yet holistically impacting the everyday, and
as the German adjective unscheinbar (traceable to the fifteenth century) refers,
it does not signify by being bright (leuchtend), manifested (offenbar), brilliant
(glänzend), or clear (klar). Yet it is distinguishable from what if nonvisible
and is not opposite of what does shine. The root scheinbar refers not to what is
obvious, but rather what seems or appears to be the case, and when the privative
un is paired up with this root, reference is made to how a thing's features are so
obscured that even a conjecture concerning its status is not made easily. As far as
any phenomenological exercise of the inconspicuous goes, it is taken for granted
here that some phenomenal experiences actively evade any attempt to grasp them
directly, and they indeed require a holistic vision for them to be experienced.