Sunday, July 15, 2018
Jason W. Alvis on Heidegger's phenomenology of the inconspicuous.
Whatever is inconspicuous has a distinctive unique "ability" (barkeit) and understood in its "paradoxical" (as "contrary to appearances") provenance, seeks to go beyond dichotomies that often hinder phenomenological thinking. It refers to what is integrated within, yet holistically impacting the everyday, and as the German adjective unscheinbar (traceable to the fifteenth century) refers, it does not signify by being bright (leuchtend), manifested (offenbar), brilliant (glänzend), or clear (klar). Yet it is distinguishable from what if nonvisible and is not opposite of what does shine. The root scheinbar refers not to what is obvious, but rather what seems or appears to be the case, and when the privative un is paired up with this root, reference is made to how a thing's features are so obscured that even a conjecture concerning its status is not made easily. As far as any phenomenological exercise of the inconspicuous goes, it is taken for granted here that some phenomenal experiences actively evade any attempt to grasp them directly, and they indeed require a holistic vision for them to be experienced.
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