In order to get at this aspect of differentiation, Heidegger's courses of 1919 again mentioned his earlier Neo-Kantian and Diltheyan notions of "heterothesis," "heterogeneity," "otherness," and "unsurveyable multiplicity" within historical reality. Here we see more clearly the an-archic character of the Ereignis of the primal something, an anarchic arche, which means that no one differntiation and effect of it, that is, a particular lifeworld, can be raised to the level of a universal arche, principle/kingdom, and privileged over other effects, except at the cost of becoming an ideological myth and principle of ontological violence. In Heidegger's SS 1919 lecture course, we read, "Every reality exhibits its own, peculiar, individual mark. There is nothing absolutely homogeneous; everything is other, everything actual is an hetergeneity." Reminiscent of his earlier Scotist notion of haecceity, such-here-now-ness, Heidegger's essay on Karl Jaspers spoke of the "hic et nunc" of the historical "situation" and again took up the old adage that "individuum est ineffabile," the individual is inexpressible, that is, cannot be reduced to essential or universal moments. But now all these earlier and still residually "theoretical" concepts were stripped of any reference to "objects" or "objectifications." In and after 1919, Heidegger was thinking rather of a heterothesis of the Ereignis and worlding-out of non-objectified historical lifeworlds, whose "contexts" or "situations" are characterized by "the unique, particular, and individual." The closing comments of his treatment of the primal something in KNS 1919 referred to both heterothesis and haecceity: "Problem of heterothesis, negation...Life is historical; no dismemberment into essential elements, but rather context."

In the background of the notion of Ereignis, we also find Heidegger's old interest in the "historical consciousness" and worldview-orientation of the German Romantics (Novalis, Schlegel), Hegel, and Dilthey. In SS 1919, Heidegger contrasted these figures with the project of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The later was guided by "a universal idea of history," namely, the progress of "civilization," over against particular peoples and "nations," especially so-called "primitive peoples" and "barbarism." This idea of univeral history was "grounded in the absolute dominion of mathematical natural science and of rational thinking in geneal at the time, " in the "triumph of pure thinking." It was expressed in, for example, Kant's notion of history as the "development and fulfillment of rational determinations, rules, and the ends of humanity." And it was articulated in a cruder form by Turgot and then later by Comte in "the law of the three stages [of human development]: the theological-mythical, the metaphysical, and the positive stages."

P. 276-277

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