Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Thomas Sheehan, in his essay "The Turn":
[I]n order to emphasize that Heidegger's work is anchored in a framework of meaning, I translate some of his terminology out of the usual ontological register into a phenomenological one.

Sinn, Bedeutungsense, meaningfulness, meaning
Sinn habensomething makes sense
Verstehento make sense of something
Seiendesthe meaningful, whatever makes sense
Seiendheit des Seiendenthe meaning of a meaningful thing
Ereignisthe meaning-giving source of the meaning of a meaningful thing

Sein selbst
Es gibt Sein
Wesen des Seins
Wahrheit des Seins
Lichtung des Seins
Schickung des Seins
the a priori process of meaning-giving in and with human being

das Da des Seins"where" meaning-giving is a priori operative
Daseinman as sustaining/holding open the a priori process of meaning-giving
Entwerfenprojectively sustaining/holding open the a priori process of meaning-giving
geworfenthrown into sustaining/holding open the a priori process of meaning-giving
Ereignisthe appropriation of man to sustaining/holding open the a priori process of meaning-giving
Kehrethe turn: the reciprocal bond of man and meaning

Readers who are uncomfortable with the translations in the chart can simply substitute - without any damage to the argument - the traditional Heideggerian code words for the terms I use here, namely, be-ing/beyng, being itself, being, beingness, and beings; the swaying/destining/essencing/presencing/clearing/truth of being, along with enowning, enquivering, cleavage and the like.

Pp. 84-85
Interesting definitions, sir--tho' at the same time, I think the terms indicate Heidegger's essential idealism--which is closer to platonic tradition (and platonic transcendence) than many realize, tho' mostly stripped of the logical/rationalist apparatus. Continuing the Peirce vs Heidegger compare and contrast, I would rate Peirce as slightly more cognizant of...external realism, more or less--i.e. "secondness",ie naturalism in a sense (that may be the "ontic" in Hei's jargon...). Humans cannot live on Dasein alone.

Pragmaticism was not anti-realist (or anti-science) in the sense that Heidegger or postmods were. While perhaps objecting to naive-empiricism, prags. still held to...observables (see Peirce's interesting essay on classification). Ockham, for instance, appears at times in Peirce's scrawls.

The Peirciean weltanschauung as it were might contain Hegelian, "process" and even deeply idealist elements, but he's still a "hard-headed" scientific thinker (in James' words).
Sheehan's entire "The Turn" essay is a the new link on beyng.com this morning; although not precisely the same as the one in the Key Concepts book. He touches on the turn as a turn from the transcendental.

Although Heidegger was surrounded by German idealists, and so often speaks in their terms, I've read some pretty good arguments that he was never an idealist.
well, if Heidegger turned or shifted to Nietzschean and/or naturalist sorts of views after WWII (as I think you yourself have suggested), that renders the earlier jargon meaningless, or nearly--tho' other philosophers have turned (the late Wittgenstein is not the Witt. of the Tractatus).

Eldred's writings (some on beyng.com) seem to affirm the transcendent reading of Dasein, at least in regard to the Hei. of SZ--also recall MH's criticism of Hegel's Weltgeist as secular (echoing Kierkegaard, as he often does).

However at one point Hei. admitted he was an atheist in regard to a judeo-christian God, did he not? Ergo, I read "Dasein as transcendence" as a type of platonic mysticism, and Hei. as not really belong to Hegelian tradition.
Couple comments.

With regard to turns, the Wittgenstein turn is a reversal, while Heidegger's turn is a shift in perspective - the later Heidegger doesn't contradict the basics of B&T. I recall William Barrett's The Illusion of Technique was go on this aspect, but its been a couple decades since I read it.

Heidegger is a atheist with regard to an onto-theological god (i.e. the prima causa god), but he seems on board with a god coming along and reconfiguring an epoch - providing a new source of meaning.

In a few places he says (or it may be Dreyfus who's more explicit about this) that it may appear he's off in the platonic realm, but that he's not, because he's actually interested in what makes realist and idealist interpretations possible, so both realists and idealists may mistakenly interpret him as simply agreeing with them.

I don't see his thinking as either in the Hegelian or Kantian tradition, but that's where/when he was, so when he's addressing his peers (e.g. neo-Kantians at Marburg) he may superficially sound like a German idealist.
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